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by se veral cases cited in the Industrial Accident Reports."
In the Fenton case the Industrial Accident Commission had
denied compensation to the wife of the employee who was
killed while investigating applications for relief in behalf
of. the California State Relief Administration. .The court
annulled the action of the commission and· directed it to
make an dward in favor of the wife of the deceased.
In the present case we are not called upon to hold that
Lehman was acting within the course of his employment at
the time of the accident, but only to determine whether there
was any substantial evidence before the court at the time the
motion for a nonsuit was made and granted, which tended to
thow that Lehman at that time was performing such a service
in behalf of his employer. As we view this evidence,we are
of the opinion that it was sufficient to have supported a
verdict in favor of the' plaintiff had the court permitted the
case to have gone to the jury.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., -Houser, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January
27, 1942. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.

[L. A. No. 17152. In Bank.

Dec. 30,1941.]

ANDREA BRIVIESCA, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant,
v. ROSARIO CORONADO, Respondent.

[2] Payment-Mode-Deposit ofOheck.-Apayee who deposits a
check in the drawee bank in his own name thereby receives
payment of the check.
[3] Negotiable Instruments-Bills of Exchange - AcceptanceWhat Oonstitutes.-An acceptance is a promise by the drawee
to pay the amount of the bill or check to the holder or subsequent holders to whom it may be negotiated; The acceptance
must be in writing and is usually on the instrument itself. The
term does not apply to the deposit, of a check in the drawee
bank by the' payee, in which case. the liability of the bank is
not based upon the check or any promise to pay it, but arises
from the relationship of debtor and creditor between the bank
and the depositor.
[4] Deeds-Actions-Weightand Sufficiency of Evidence-Identity of Parties.-In an action by an administratrix to quiet
title to properties standing in the names of the deceased, L. B.,
and Rosario or Roseta B., and of L.· B.. and Mrs. L. B., the
court was justified in finding that the defendant and the person named as co-owner were the same person.
[5] Id.---Actions-Admissibility of Evidence-Marriage to Grantee.-Where a person sues in her capaci ty as personal representative of the estate of L. B., to quiet title to rea.l property
standing in. the name of L. B., and Mrs. L. B., as against tho
claim of the former wife, it is proper to exclude evidence
offered to show that the plaintiff had been married to the deceased.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Riverside County. Wm. D. Dehy, Judge Assigned. Affirmed.
Action by administratrix to quiet title to two .parcels
of real property and a bank deposit. Judgment for defendant .excepting a' op:e-half interest· in one of the parcels of
real property, affirmed.

[la, Ib] Banks-Deposits-Gift of Deposit.-Where a check to
effectuate a gift was deposited in the drawee bank by the
donor's agent who opened an account in the name of the payee,
the deposit constituted payment of the check to the payee
and completed the gift of the£unds, although the donor subsequently died before the making of the rubber stamp endorsements on the check and the entry of the new account in the
bank's ledger.

TRAYNOR, J.--:-Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of
Luz Briviesca, brought this action to quiet title to two par,.

McK. Dig. References: [1] Banks, § 88; [2] Payment, § 8; [3]
Negotiable Instruments, § 148; [4J Deeds, § 180; [5] Deeds, § 169.

[3] See 4 Oal. Jur. 186; 19 Cal. Jur. 937; 7 Am. Jur. 313; 8
Am. Jur. 514.

J ~hn H. Myers for Appellant.
Gordon P. Shallenberger for Respondent.
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eels of real property and a sum of money on deposit in .a
bank, claimed by defendant. The trial court. entered judgment for defendant, excepting a one.;.half interest in one of
the parcels of real property, and plaintiff has appealed,challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the
judgment.
[1] Luz Briviesca, the deceased, was injured in an automobile accident. Shortly before his death he stated to his
employer that he was about to die, signed a check payable
to defendant for the balance of his bank account, and re-·
quested the employer to deposit the check to defendant's
account as her agent in the same bank upon which the check
was drawn. The employer, acting as agent for defendant,
entered the bank just before closing time, opened an account
in the name of defendant by depositing the check, and received a deposit ~Iip in the name of the defendant. The
rubber stamp endorsements on the check· and the entry of
defendant's account in the bank's ledger were both made
the following day. The deceased died a few hours after the
deposit was made.
Plaintiff contends that the execution of a check in favor
of defendant cannot constitute a valid gift passing title to
the funds on deposit to defendant before acceptance or payment by the bank, and that the death of decedent before the
check was endorsed or the account entered in the ledger revoked the check before acceptance or payment.
The check, however, was deposited in the drawee bank
to the account of defendant-payee before the death of the donor.
This deposit constituted payment of the check by the bank
to the defendant, thus completing the gift before the death
of the donor. [2] It is well settled that if the payee deposits
the check in the drawee bank in his own name, he thereby
receives payment of the check. (Utah Oonst. Co. v.W estern
Pacific Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 156, 164, 165 [162 Pac. 631],
Greenzweight v. Title Guaranty & Tr. Co., 1 Cal. (2d) 577,
581 [36 Pac. (2d) 186], see cases cited in Brannan's Nego~
tiable Instruments' Law (6th ed.), p. 893; 14 Minn.L. Rev.
284; 2 Morse, Banks and Banking, sec. 451.) In effect he
receives the money from the bank and immediately deposits
it therein. (Ibid.) [3] Such a transaction is not an acceptance of the check by the bank. An acceptance is a promise
by the drawee to pay· the amount of the bill or check to the
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holder or subsequent holders to whom it may be negotiated.
The acceptance must be in writing and is usually on the
instrument itself. (Civ. Code, sec. 3213.) It contemplates
further negotiation of the instrument .. When a check is deposited in the drawee bank, it is removed from circulation
and cancelled. No further negotiation is contemplated. The
liability of the bank to the depositor-payee is not based upon
the check or any promise by the bank to pay the check, but
arises from the relationship of debtor and creditor that exists
between a bank and a depositor. (See cases cited in 7 Am.
JUl'. 313, sec. 444.)
[lb] In the instant case this relationship came into existence at the time the deposit waS made,
not at the time the check was stamped and the account posted
in the ledger.
[4] The record shows that Parcel I of the real property
was owned by the deceased, Luz Briviesca, and Rosario
Briviesca or Roseta Briviesca as joint tenants, and Parcel II
was owned by Luz Briviesca and Mrs. Luz Briviesca as tenants in common. The trial court found that Roseta Briviesca
and Mrs. Luz. Briviesca were the same person, namely, the
defendant in this action. It therefore held that defendant
was entitled to all of Parcel I as surviving joint tenant and
to one-half of Parcel II as tenant in common. The other half
of Parcel I was awarded to plaintiff as administratrix of the
estate of Luz Briviesca, the other tenant in common. The
trial court was justified in finding that the defendant was
the. person named in the deeds as co-owner of the parcels of
realty in question, and the record contains no evidence that
plaintiff, as administratrix, was the owner of any more than
a one-half interest in Parcel II. (See 22 Cal. JUl'. 122,
sec. 11.)
[5] Since plaintiff sued in her representative capacity
and riot as an individual, the. trial court committed no error
in excluding evidence offered by plaintiff to show that she,
too, had been married to the deceased.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Carter, J., concurred.

